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Highlights 
 
• The central premises of the ecocentric organisation literature are identified. 
• Three essential qualities of objects for ecocentric theorising are proposed. 
• The implications for ecological practice and theory are discussed. 
• It is concluded that a new ontology is needed in the Anthropocene. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
As a response to anthropogenic ecological problems, a group of organisation scholars 
have acknowledged the importance of ecocentric theorising that takes materiality and 
non-human objects seriously. The purpose of this article is to examine the philosophical 
basis of ecocentric organisation studies and develop an ontological outline for 
ecocentric theorising in the Anthropocene. The paper identifies the central premises of 
ecocentric organisations from the previous literature, and complements the theory with a 
set of ontological qualities common to all objects. The study draws on recent advances 
in object-oriented and ecological philosophies to present three essential qualities of 
objects, namely autonomy, uniqueness, and intrinsicality. The paper discusses how 
these qualities are critical in reclaiming the lost credibility and practical relevance of 
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ecocentrism in both organisational theory and the sustainability sciences in general. To 
organise human activities in a sustainable manner in the new geological era, a new 
ontology is needed that not only includes materiality and non-humans in the analysis, 
but also leads to an ecologically and ethically broader understanding of ecospheric 
beings and their relationships. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the era of the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002), it is 
increasingly acknowledged that the way human life is organised is ecologically 
damaging and jeopardises the existence of most beings (MA, 2005; Barnosky et al., 
2011; IPCC, 2014). Especially since the Industrial Revolution, or more precisely the 
invention of the steam engine, the biosphere and its local ecosystems have undergone 
radical changes in terms of rising temperatures and a reduction in biodiversity 
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2008; Barnosky et al., 2012). Climate scientists have recorded a 
worrying global temperature rise of 1 °C since the early twentieth century 
(NASA/GISS, 2014), while biologists and palaeontologists have suggested that the sixth 
mass extinction might be on the horizon if the current rate of species loss continues 
(Barnosky et al., 2011, 2012; Ceballos et al., 2015). These two changes in the 
environment are assumed to be causally related, so that global warming is leading to 
biodiversity loss, as ecosystems and their organisms are unable to adapt to the rapid 
climatic changes in their habitat (MA, 2005). To avert further damage, continued 
population growth, excessive resource use and environmental deterioration are 
challenges that humanity must deal with within the next few decades (Steffen et al., 
2007), and arguably, the sooner the better (see e.g., Ceballos et al., 2015). 
 
Despite the severity of the ecological challenge, and particularly the significant role that 
the organisation of production has in the climate crisis (Barnosky et al., 2012; IPCC, 
2014), ecological questions have remained at the periphery of contemporary 
organisation theory, as reviewed by Cunha et al. (2008). Rather than focussing on the 
non-human and material aspects of the world, organisational enquiries have tended to 
emphasise the role of humans and non-material aspects of the organisation (Fleetwood, 
2005; Orlikowski, 2010). It follows that organisational studies are inclined to reproduce 
the anthropocentric and antirealist philosophical tradition of science, as the human 
experience is favoured at the expense of the non-human world. The absence of an 
ecological perspective on organising human activity seems likely to lead the way deeper 
into the Anthropocene with unpleasant consequences not only for the human species but 
also for the ecosystem as a whole. 
 
The lack of organisational theorising from an ecological perspective was first noticed in 
the mid-1990s, when the relationship between organisations and the natural 
environment attracted scholarly attention (Shrivastava, 1994; Gladwin et al., 1995; Clair 
et al., 1996). Some of the early scholars discussed, for instance, the relevance of 
organisational activities to developments such as overpopulation and overconsumption 
(Starik and Rands, 1995), as well as the limitations of an anthropocentric worldview in 
dealing with ecological problems (Purser et al., 1995). Thus, instead of continuing to 
position human actors above other beings and interpreting the world in terms of human 
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values, these scholars developed and called for ecocentric approaches in the ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological domains of organisation studies (Shrivastava, 1994, 
1995; Purser et al., 1995; Starik and Rands, 1995; Starik, 1995). 
 
While the call was not immediately taken up, a few organisational scholars have 
recently expressed signs of ecocentric theorising by embedding social actors in the 
ecosystem (Whiteman and Cooper, 2000), recognising the interconnectedness of all 
actors in the ecosystem (Valente, 2012; Newton, 2002), and advancing ethical 
considerations for the non-human world (Gosling and Case, 2013; Ezzamel and 
Willmott, 2014). Critics of ecocentrism, however, have continued to question the 
necessity and practicality of ecocentric thought, as well as the underpinnings of its 
worldview (Hanna, 1996). An intellectually well-founded critique on ecocentrism has 
been presented on the feasibility of reordering the human relationship with the natural 
environment, and on the dualistic representations of nature and humans (Newton, 2002). 
These fundamental, yet constructive strictures on ecocentrism, coming from both the 
managerial and sociological sides of organisation studies, invite environmental 
scientists to revisit the philosophical foundations of ecocentric theory. 
 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine the philosophical basis 
of ecocentric organisation studies, and develop an ontological outline for ecocentric 
theorising in the Anthropocene. The study is guided by the following research 
questions: (a) what are the central premises of ecocentric organisations in the previous 
literature, and (b) how might these premises be complemented in order to respond to the 
criticism of ecocentric thought and advance ontology for an ecological organisation? 
 
Without a thorough discussion on the basic categories of being and how they relate to 
each other (particularly those between human and non-human objects), the task of 
advancing ecocentric theory becomes not only extremely demanding, but can also 
threaten the credibility of the approach and attract criticism of a failure to deliver 
practical value. The importance of focussing on ontological questions is reinforced by 
the premise that the way humans perceive objects–and their relations–will influence the 
way things are (and will be) organised. Hence, the nature of objects is crucial in the 
search for ecological organisations, including sustainable modes of production1. 
 
The paper begins with a brief introduction to the questions of ontology in organisation 
studies and provides an overview of the challenges related to the Anthropocene: the 
current geological era2. The study proceeds to review the ways previous studies in the 
field of the organisation and the natural environment have conceptualised human–nature 
relationships, and also to identify the central premises of ecocentric organisations. To 
advance ecocentric theorising, the paper draws on object-oriented and ecological 
philosophies to arrive at a set of essential qualities of objects. Lastly, it proposes an 
ontological outline for further studies and concludes by discussing the implications of 
the outline for ecological practice and theory. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 A sustainable mode of production as imagined in this study is not limited to the early German concept on sustainability 
(Nachhaltigkeit), which appeared in 1712 in the writings of von Carlowitz “to indicate how monetary profits could be made from 
nature by obtaining optimum sustainable yields” (Martinez-Alier, 2014, p. 38) but is instead in line with the idea of strong 
sustainability (e.g., Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Beckerman, 1995; Ayres et al., 2001). 
2 A team of scientists led by Jan Zalasiewicz announced that in 2017 a decision will be made on whether the current geological 
epoch will be officially re-named (Schwägerl, 2013). 
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2. Ontological questions in the age of humans 
 
The field of organisation studies has undergone several intellectual redirections or turns 
within its relatively short history (Reed, 2005). Some of these turns have dealt with the 
means of acquiring and analysing data, while others have focused more on the 
assumptions related to the nature of knowledge and reality, or ontology. The ontological 
position of a person, community, or turn, could be described as a way of understanding 
the nature of reality. An ontology can also more directly, and quite literally, be thought 
of as how the world is: ‘what exists, and so what are the primary entities of concern in 
any given ﬁeld, and what are their most general features and relationships’ (Spash, 
2012, p. 37). Moreover, as ontologies deal with the question of existence and being, 
they are often considered the most profound concerns in scientific enquiries. 
 
Fleetwood (2005, p. 197) describes the ontological discussion in organisation studies as 
ambiguous, ‘which makes it difficult to get to the bottom of ontological claims and, of 
course, to locate the source of any ontological errors’. Ontological discussions often 
also mix with epistemological questions (that relate to knowledge) and axiological 
questions (that relate to value), which make them even more complex and challenging 
to grasp. Owing to its often-assumed lack of practical implications for managers and its 
weak relevance to what might be called the publication rat race, ontology (as a study of 
being and existence) might also have a forbidding echo for some organisation theorists. 
However, if scholars seek ecologically advanced understandings of organisations, the 
examination of ontologies may offer not only prolific grounds and stimulating avenues 
in the quest for considering different objects and their relations, such as man-made 
organisations and the natural environment, but may also be unavoidable in the current 
times of ecological, and sociocultural, turmoil. The climatic and geological changes are 
arguably pressing humans to rethink their relationship with other humans and the non-
human world through recent phenomena like climate refugees and mass extinctions. 
 
The ontologies in organisation studies have recently been heavily influenced by the 
cultural, linguistic, post-structural or postmodern approaches that build on an idea of 
socially constructed realities (Fleetwood, 2005). For an ecocentric inquiry, this 
development can be considered problematic because, in the antirealist ontology, a world 
does not exist independent of human perception, and because the proponents of 
antirealism do not subscribe to any causal scientific independence of matters of fact in 
the world (Mäki, 2008). To put it bluntly, if the causality of human action and 
ecological harm cannot be propounded with any degree of certainty, then protective 
measures (e.g., conservation efforts) are difficult to justify and legitimise. 
 
According to a recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
main causes of global warming are anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, which are 
in turn undesired consequences of economic and population growth (IPCC, 2014), and 
particularly the former (UNEP, 2011; Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014). The growth of 
economies (measured in gross national product) and in the number of human inhabitants 
on the planet, have meant a rising demand for food, mobility, housing and other goods 
and services (Latouche, 2009; Jackson, 2011). The production of these goods and 
services has led not only to growing pressure on the atmosphere through emissions, but 
also to growing pressure on land and water occasioned by their utilisation for 
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production purposes: ‘During the course of the 20th century, average resource use per 
capita merely doubled,’ while ‘the global annual material extraction increased […] by a 
factor of eight’ (UNEP, 2011, p. 17–18). The use of the term Anthropocene – the Age 
of Humans – is apt to describe this current era of global climate change and negative 
human influences on ecological processes (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002; 
Zalasiewicz et al., 2008).3 In ontological terms, this signifies that humans are not only 
observers of the Anthropocene but a central causal factor in the unfolding of reality: a 
dominant ingredient of the planetary ecosystem. 
 
For a large part of the scientific community, it is apparent that ecosystems are now 
setting limits to the expansion of organised human activity (Rockström et al., 2009; 
Steffen et al., 2015). Unsustainable development has been enabled by medical and other 
technical advances, by an unequal global exchange of energy and other natural 
resources (Hornborg, 2014), particularly fossil fuels (Wrigley, 2010), as well as a major 
growth in agriculture and animal husbandry (Crutzen and Steffen, 2003). In terms of 
material limits, non-renewable natural resources are running out and renewable 
resources are being consumed at a faster rate than they can renew (e.g., Lorek and 
Spangenberg, 2014). Concerning less tangible limits, again, the atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentration has been found to be too great and the global nitrogen cycle to be 
too disrupted to ensure a safe operating space for humanity and other species 
(Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). These estimates concerning the state of 
the planet are certainly surrounded by uncertainties, but the important point here is that 
if humans are to steer away from the worst-case scenarios of collapsing ecosystems and 
civilisations, human activities should be reorganised in ecologically sustainable ways 
(Goodland and Daly 1996). 
 
In ontological terms, an ecologically substantive understanding of ‘being’ in the 
Anthropocene epoch thus calls for a more realist approach in organisation studies. 
Considering an organisation merely as a socially constructed phenomenon might lead to 
overlooking the material basis of all human activity in the ecosystem. Any such 
exclusion of materiality and non-human objects from the analysis is not only 
scientifically limited, but also highly dangerous if it propounds a worldview where 
ecological destruction is not considered problematic beyond human interests. Thus, 
without doubt, ‘in certain instances it might be “appropriate”, “justifiable” and 
eminently sensible to look for something other than human language in order to 
appreciate the force of phenomena like human responsibility and harm; simply recurring 
to discourse may often be unsatisfactory’ (Holt and Mueller, 2011, p. 82). Moreover, 
denying reality independent of the human subject is disturbingly anthropocentric, which 
again is shown to be limited in its usefulness in solving the complex ecological 
problems that organisations now face (Purser et al., 1995). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 It is important to note what Graham Harman (in Koot and Grootveld, 2015, p. 1) expressed in a recent interview: “[the] 
Anthropocene Epoch is not an Anthropocentric Epoch, because it highlights the fragility of the human species rather than human 
supremacy. This split between the Anthropocene and the Anthropocentric compels us to recognise an important philosophical 
distinction that is seldom acknowledged. Namely, the fact that humans are involved as ingredients in the creation of some entity 
does not entail that the entity has no autonomous reality apart from humans. The Anthropocene climate is generated by humans and 
independently mysterious to us, and the same holds for other fields that have been ‘anthropocene’ from the start: human society, art, 
economics.” 
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Against this call for a new ontological frame, the next section reviews and discusses the 
main premises of, and advances in, ecological organisation literature. In the current 
study an ecological organisation refers to those organisational orderings that take place 
within the bioregional and global, and material boundaries of ecosystems, and hence 
embrace the existence and prosperity of humans, as well as other beings. 
 
 
3. Organisations and the natural environment 
 
In the Western tradition, the origins of ecological thought on organising human action 
can be traced to influential North-American texts such as Nature (Emerson, 1836), 
Walden (Thoreau, 1854), and Silent Spring (Carson, 1962). In Europe, important early 
contributions to ecological thinking were Capital: Critique of Political Economy (Marx, 
[1867] 1992) and The Technological Society (Ellul, [1954] 1964). The authors of these 
far-sighted texts identified and reported on a development whereby humans are 
becoming increasingly distanced from the natural environment (i.e. non-man-made 
objects), but are becoming a greater force in shaping it (i.e. turning non-man-made 
objects into man-made ones). Most of these seminal works explicitly acknowledged that 
a major reason for such a rapid change in the human–nature relationship lies in the 
advance of industrial and technological organisations. 
 
Although these organisations of different shapes and sizes are considered to be a 
‘primary instrument by which humans impact their natural environment’ (Shrivastava, 
1994, p. 705), organisation studies have paid relatively little attention to the human 
relationship with the non-human world, and likewise, have largely overlooked the 
threats evident in the Anthropocene. A rather small group of scholars, however, have 
discussed ecological questions related to organisations (e.g., Shrivastava, 1994; 
Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Purser et al., 1995), some with a focus on the 
economic organisation (Welford, 1995; Hart, 1995; Clair et al., 1996), for over two 
decades (for a summary, see Gladwin et al., 1995). More recently, continuations to 
these pioneering studies have emerged (Valente, 2012; Gosling and Case, 2013; 
Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014), but large-scale attention to ecological questions in 
organisation theory yet to come. 
 
3.1. Embeddedness in the ecosystem 
 
In the early 1990s, it became clear that the view offered by mainstream organisation 
studies in analysing the surroundings of organisations was denatured, narrow, and 
parochial due to its emphasis on the economic, social, political, and technological 
aspects of organisational environments (Shrivastava, 1994). This profound critique of 
the underlying assumptions of the field led to an opportunity to reconceptualise the 
organisational environment so that the significance of the non-human world was 
recognised in explaining and understanding social activity. The centrality of nature 
became obvious with the realisation that all individuals and organisations, as well as 
sociocultural and political-economic systems, are embedded in the planetary ecosystem 
(Starik and Rands, 1995; Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014). 
 
While ecological embeddedness applies to all societies, institutions and organisations, it 
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also holds true on the individual level. Whiteman and Cooper (2000, p. 1265) explain 
this as follows: ‘To be ecologically embedded as a manager is to personally identify 
with the land, to adhere to beliefs of ecological respect, reciprocity, and caretaking, to 
actively gather ecological information, and to be physically located in the ecosystem’. 
The important finding from the search for ecological organisations is that the degree of 
ecological embeddedness is linked to managers’ commitment to, and engagement in an 
ecological praxis (Whiteman and Cooper, 2000). Thus, instead of making organisational 
decisions based on mere technical knowledge, ‘which removes the knower from the 
process of knowing’ (Purser et al., 1995, p. 1060), embeddedness is related to 
situational knowledge that comprises first-hand experience of local ecosystems 
(Whiteman and Cooper, 2000). It goes without saying that the premise of embeddedness 
radically changes the manner in which the human–nature relationship is perceived and 
organisations are managed (see Tilley, 2000). 
 
3.2. Dependency on the ecosystem 
 
Instead of presupposing nature is something distinct from humanity and an infinite pool 
of resources for economic, or other human activity, humankind has been forced to admit 
that ecosystems are finite (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; Daly, 1979) with material 
boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015), and the parts are dependent on 
the whole (Naess, [1974] 1989). As human organisations ‘receive a number of inputs 
from various ecosystems, including air, water, land, minerals, energy, animals, plants, 
and microbial life’ (Starik and Rands, 1995, p. 917) that are critical to their existence 
and success (Hart, 1995), the material dependency of organisations on the planetary 
ecosystem became obvious. In other words, the ecosphere provides the conditions 
essential to the existence of humans and organisations (Shrivastava, 1995), as well as 
those required to conduct economic or any other activity (Starik and Rands, 1995). 
 
In their study, Starik and Rands (1995, p. 928) demonstrated how ‘organizations have 
environmentally oriented interactions with other levels and systems, and [how] these are 
integrated in […] a web of relationships’. This insight signifies a shift from atomistic 
and reductionist ideas to perceiving interconnectedness: all actors in the ecosystems are 
connected (Valente, 2012; Newton, 2002). Many ecologically oriented organisation 
scholars have employed the notion of interdependency to describe the relationship 
between human organisations and the natural environment (Newton, 2002; Valente, 
2012; Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014), while others have refrained from the use of the 
term (e.g., Starik and Rands, 1995; Purser et al., 1995). According to Gladwin et al. 
(1995), this disparity can be explained by a difference in ontological stances. Ecocentric 
theorists assume that an entity (e.g., an economic organisation) that is embedded in the 
ecosystem is dependent on the ecosystem; however, the whole ecosystem is not 
dependent on every single part of it. That is to say, life on the planet may well continue 
without any human organisation, but a human organisation cannot continue without the 
planet. However, organised human actions undoubtedly have an effect on local and 
global ecosystems as all objects are interconnected, and thus a degree of 
interdependency can be argued, but to propose an equivalent interdependency between 
objects would be a fallacy. Hence, it is posited that certain objects (e.g., the Earth) are 
more dependent on other objects (e.g., the sun) than others are (e.g., a business 
organisation). 
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3.3. Value of the ecosystem 
 
While anthropocentric organisation studies continue the construction of an ontological 
hierarchy and a moral order, where humans are above or apart from the ecosystem 
(Purser et al., 1995), ecocentric theorists respectfully consider all human organisations 
as subordinate to the planetary ecosystem. In ecocentrism, nature as a whole is ‘more 
important than humans, as humans are simply one animal species in the ecosystem’ 
(Ketola, 2008, p. 426). This reverse in the construction of the ontological and moral 
hierarchy is not favoured by most relational theorists (e.g., Newton, 2002), as for them 
the world will ‘remain flat at all points’ (Latour, 1996, p. 240). Despite neglecting the 
difference in the relations between the whole and its parts, a flat ontology is an 
important step away from anthropocentrism, but it does not extend to ecocentrism, 
which broadens the idea of community to include ecological wholes (such as forests, 
wetlands, lakes and deserts) and also extends moral value to ecological organisms 
(Purser et al., 1995). This broadened view is radically different from the prevailing 
understandings of value, where any non-instrumental value in the non-human world is 
received with anxiety. 
 
While anthropocentrism can also work as a basis for developing an ecological 
conscience when motivated by concerns about intergenerational equity and justice 
(Johnson, 1988, p. 610), major problems arise from anthropocentrism for the ecological 
organisation. The main problem with anthropocentrism is not that it is human-centred 
(Purser et al., 1995, p. 1054), ‘or even that its proponents view nature instrumentally, 
but with proponents’ tendency to view human beings as sole locus of value and measure 
of all things’ (Purser and Montuori, 1996, p. 611). A further problem with the largely 
prevalent anthropocentrism in organisational theory (Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014) and 
practice (Tilley, 2000) is that it influences the code of ethics towards nature by 
essentially denying that nature could have any inherent worth (Purser et al., 1995). This, 
of course, has severe consequences for how humans interact with the non-human world. 
 
A few organisation scholars have lately started to raise questions concerning the 
reflective dismissal of the anthropocentric ethos. For instance, Wright et al. (2013, p. 
647) ask: ‘how can we imagine alternatives to our current path of ever escalating 
greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth?’ Gosling and Case (2013, p. 716) 
suggest that the social dreaming found in many traditional cultures ‘may offer us a route 
to discover meanings that are not accessible within normal conscious rationality’, like a 
non-anthropocentric moral frame. Similarly, Ezzamel and Willmott (2014, p. 2) suggest 
that ‘unclosing the ethical register invites novel thinking about established forms of 
knowledge, and thereby opens up new vistas of theory development and empirical 
investigations’, and importantly for the present research, ‘attentiveness to the ethical 
register is seen to invite radical reflection on a dominant, anthropocentric value-
orientation’ (Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014, p. 1). A desired outcome of these reflections 
could be an ecocentric ontology and an ethical frame that encompasses extended and 
deepened care for humans as well as non-humans (cf. Naess, 1997). 
 
Table 1 summarises the central premises in the previous ecocentric organisation 
literature and the conceptualisation of human–nature relationships. Next, the paper 
proposes and discusses three essential qualities of all objects (mixing humans and non-
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humans), derived from object-oriented and ecological philosophies, to complement 
ecocentric theorising. 
 
 
Table 1. The table illustrates the central premises in the ecocentric organisation 
literature and the consequent conceptualisations of human–nature relationships. 
 
Central premise 
 
Embeddedness in the ecosystem 
 
 
Dependency on the ecosystem 
 
 
Value of the ecosystem 
 
 
Description of the 
premise 
 
Humans and their organisations 
are embedded in ecosystems 
 
Humans and their organisations 
are dependent on ecosystems 
 
 
Humans and their organisations 
are not the only source of 
intrinsic value 
 
 
Conceptualisation 
of human–nature 
relationships 
 
Human and man-made objects 
are embedded in non-human and 
non-man-made objects 
 
Human and man-made objects 
are dependent on non-human and 
non-man-made objects!
 
 
In addition to human and man-
made objects, non-human and 
non-man-made objects can also 
hold intrinsic value!
 
 
 
4. Essential qualities of objects for ecocentric theorising 
 
As discussed above, previous studies on ecocentrism assume organisational 
embeddedness in, and dependency on, the planetary ecosystem (and also regional 
ecosystems), and enable a departure from anthropocentrism. In terms of the human–
nature relationship, the premise of embeddedness of the ecosystem suggests that human 
and man-made objects are embedded in non-human and non-man-made objects, while 
the premise of dependency on the ecosystem denotes that the human and man-made 
objects are dependent on non-human and non-man-made objects. Moreover, with regard 
to the premise of value of the ecosystem, non-human and non-man-made objects may 
also hold intrinsic value (Table 1). 
 
But since ecocentric theory attracts accusations of dualism by maintaining the analytical 
separation between humans and non-humans, normativity through its calls for radical 
change, and an unsatisfactory representation of nature (Newton, 2002), reimagining the 
ontological basis on ecocentric theorising is a worthwhile exercise. 
 
4.1. Autonomy of objects 
 
One way to avoid the often-problematized human–nature and subject–object dualism in 
ecocentric thought (Guattari, 1989; Newton, 2002) is to consider both human subjects 
and nature-objects equally as objects among other objects. This radical idea of object-
oriented philosophy asserts that an enquiry cannot be merely about the humans in the 
world, but must encompass other things and objects (such as crude oil and the oceans), 
including their fundamental relations and characteristics (Harman, 2002, 2009). So far 
many fields of research, including material culture studies, have ignored factors like the 
achievements and impacts of [non-human] living organisms (Ingold, 2012). 
 
The distinction between the notions of things and objects should be noted. For Ingold 
(2012), objects are completed forms that stand over and against the perceiver and block 
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further movement. He rejects the notion of the object and takes materiality for what it 
is–made and finished–and turns to things to emphasise the gatherings of materials in 
movement, as distinct from objects. In Ingold’s (2012) ecology of materials, a focus on 
the life of materials prioritises the processes of production over those of consumption. 
Ingold thus insists on a radical distinction between object and thing, drawing inspiration 
primarily from an influential essay, entitled The Thing by Heidegger ([1971] 2001, p. 
165–182). For Harman (2009) again, all things are objects. Thus real objects include 
those things without matter and relation. And the ‘real objects […] withdraw from all 
human view and even from all relations with each other’ (Harman (2009, p. 195), 
making the essential qualities that this paper seeks to outline rather more a matter of 
perception than actuality. 
 
Another crucial difference is that while Ingold’s (2011) largely enquires into what 
things do, Harman (2009) seeks to understand what objects are. For an ecological 
organisation, both tasks are definitely important. In the present enquiry, however, the 
focus is on the latter as the study seeks to complement ecocentric thought with a set of 
essential qualities common to all objects. These qualities are within the object itself, not 
to be found in its relation to other objects (Harman, 2009). 
 
Object-oriented philosophy differs in an important way from the relational tradition 
(e.g., actor-network theorising by Latour, 1996, 2005; Johnson, 1988), as it does not 
consider objects as fully defined by their relationships with other objects, but views 
objects as entities that have a certain autonomy (Harman, 2002, 2009, see also Morin, 
1994, 2008). In other words, when compared to relational ontologies (e.g., Latour, 
2005; Johnson, 1988), a distinctive feature of the object orientation is that objects are 
not fully defined by their relationships with other objects, but have a degree of 
autonomy (Harman, 2002, 2009; Pierides and Woodman, 2012). Harman (2009, p. 132), 
one of the key contributors of speculative realism, explains objects and their relations as 
follows: 
 
[...] there are countless actors of different sizes and types, constantly duelling and negotiating with 
each other. But objects are not defined by their relations: instead they are what enter into relations 
in the first place, and their allies can never fully mine their ores. In Heideggerian terms, objects 
enter relations but withdraw from them as well; objects are built of components, but exceed those 
components. Things exist not in relation, but in a strange sort of vacuum from which they only 
partly emerge into relation. 
 
However, such autonomy is relative: ‘we will have to conceive the system in its relation 
with its environment, in its relation with time, in its relation finally with the 
observer/conceiver’ (Morin [1977] 1992, p. 123). Human and man-made objects are 
embedded in non-human and non-man-made objects. While the existential 
phenomenological tradition of Heidegger ([1927] 1962) is also inclined to consider 
objects as subordinate to human access to them, the present study draws a non-
anthropocentric ontological line, where objects may not only exist but also thrive 
independently of human perception and presence. This means that not all objects 
depend on the subject (cf. Morin, [1994] 2008, p. 108), and it is exactly because of this 
that the autonomy of objects is highly relevant to the task of developing ecocentric 
theorising, as it offers an exit from the anthropocentric and dualistic conceptual frames 
of thought. 
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Humans should no longer speak of relations between people and things, because people 
are things too (Ingold, 2012) but should instead address everything as an object 
(Harman, 2009). The importance of this post-human ontological turn is that when each 
thing becomes an object, the material and non-human worlds, and their relations with 
other objects, are also included in the analysis (Pierides and Woodman, 2012). For an 
organisational analysis, this signifies that ‘all objects and their relations matter’ 
(Pierides and Woodman, 2012, p. 663), as they become full members of the world 
community (Purser et al., 1995). This helps not only to account for the missing living 
(and non-living) organisms in the scholarly analysis, but it also helps to erase the 
division between ecological and social, and encourages people to view organisms as 
parts of an intertwined process of becoming (Ingold and Palsson, 2013). Things are not 
mere objects of perception, but part of the world-in-formation. In other words, rather 
than considering humans as subjects and observers, becoming prompts us to view 
humans as objects and participants (Ingold, 2011), as well as beings with the capability 
to act as the observers of the observer (Morin, [1994] 2008). 
 
4.2. Intrinsicality of objects 
 
The ethical register of theory building often tends to be overlooked (Ezzamel and 
Willmott, 2014), but in this paper axiological questions are considered an integral part 
of the ontological outline. When independent non-human entities enter the equation, the 
traditional anthropocentric assumptions are likely to be challenged (Pierides and 
Woodman, 2012). However, the inclusion of non-human objects in the analysis, 
although signalling that analysis is taking the materiality of organisations seriously, 
does not mean that an ecocentric ethos would automatically emerge. In fact, there is a 
danger the post-human approaches develop into post-humane, and perhaps violent, 
forms of actions unless the question of value is explicitly addressed. 
 
The second quality of objects adds depth to the ecocentric organisation theory by 
suggesting that every object (including agents such as ants or humans, structures such as 
buildings or religions, and processes such as thinking or life) has intrinsic value. 
Following intrinsicalism (Gladwin et al., 1995), this quality of objects can be called 
intrinsicality. It is important to note here that the intrinsicality of objects does not 
denote that all objects are proper, good or right in the ethical sense. Nevertheless, by 
assuming this quality is present, no object is considered merely an instrument for, or 
means to, another object: instead objects become valued in themselves. This signifies 
that non-human objects are valuable independently of human objects (Naess, 1973, 
[1974] 1989) and fosters the view of a human object as an object among others. In 
contrast to the anthropocentric form of thought, ecocentric scholars are able to escape 
the human–nature value dichotomy through a premise of inherent equality and justice 
between all objects. 
 
According to Naess (1973), such broadened egalitarianism, however, only works in 
principle. This is because ‘any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, 
and suppression’ (Naess, 1973, p. 95). Moreover, Naess ([1974] 1989, p. 95-96) 
explains the inclusive form of egalitarianism as follows: 
 
The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of 
life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for 
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fellow men and for a narrow selection of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field worker, 
the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to 
humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans 
themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from 
close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a 
master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself. 
 
In the above excerpt, Naess illustrates how the understanding of the intrinsicality of 
objects relates to both human ethics and aesthetics, and how humans have a natural 
attraction to life. Ingold (2011, p. 39), somewhat similarly, connects value and senses as 
he states that ‘nothing, however, better illustrates the value placed upon a sedentary 
perception of the world, mediated by the allegedly superior senses of vision and 
hearing, and unimpeded by any haptic or kinaesthetic sensation through the fee’ 
(Ingold, 2011, p. 39). That is, ethics and aesthetics are to a great extent intertwined 
(Bateson, [1972] 2000; Kagan, 2010). While human objects have the skill of aesthetic 
evaluation, which surely helps people to perceive value in the non-human world, it does 
not denote that the value of objects is dependent on humans assigning such value to 
objects. In Naess’ ([1974] 1989) terms, it instead refers to the human realisation of the 
inherent value in objects, and its consequences for humans (e.g., in terms of aesthetic 
experiences). The quality of intrinsicality hence contrasts with instrumentalism, which 
views the value of objects only in relation to other objects. While the value of objects 
largely unfolds in relation to others (Bateson, [1972] 2000; Latour, 2005), intrinsicality 
posits that value is a quality rather than a relation. 
 
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, humans might find themselves forced to leave the still 
largely prevalent anthropocentric premises behind in order to save the human species 
while not destroying others. In practice, this would first mean recognising the human 
place within the complex ecosphere, then admitting the limitations of human intellectual 
mechanisms in understanding the complexity, and third, proceeding with precaution and 
respect for all objects. But leaving anthropocentrism behind also necessitates and 
implies an ecosophical language that turns the enquiry away from human-centred 
discourse and practices based on the instrumentalisation of objects. Fortunately, there is 
an increased awareness of the connection between ‘scientific truth, on the one hand, and 
beauty and morality, on the other: that if a man entertain false opinions regarding his 
own nature [or arguably regarding any nature], he will be led thereby to courses of 
action which will be in some profound sense immoral and ugly’ (Bateson, [1972] 2000, 
p. 265). 
 
4.3. Uniqueness of objects 
 
The rationale for considering everything as an object and assuming all objects come 
with intrinsic value comes from the realisation that an object’s existence (and 
becoming) is always exceptional. Objects, be they persons, flowers, events, sounds, or 
other phenomena, disclose in a specific time and place a horizon that is always unique. 
To ontologically arrive at this idea of uniqueness, objects are considered to be 
irreducible to their constituent parts (Naess, [1974] 1989; Harman, 2009). For example, 
‘any attempt to undermine an object – in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with 
the ravages of time or global warming – will not get at the withdrawn essence of the 
object’ (Morton, 2011, p. 150). It is crucial to note that objects cannot be rejected and 
!!
13 
reduced to anything: objects are what objects are. This signifies that objects are 
irreplaceable (Naess, [1974] 1989) and non-substitutable (Daly, 1979). 
 
The substitutability of objects is often assumed in economics and reductionist ecological 
studies (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl, 2013). However, objects such as natural and 
human capital are not substitutable but only complementary (Daly, 1979), if even that. 
For an ecological enquiry, the non-substitutability factor is of vital importance, as man-
made objects such as thoughts, machines and economic processes cannot substitute for 
non-man-made objects (such as stars, forests and species), and vice versa. Daly (1996, 
p. 76) explains this non-substitutability vividly: 
 
One way to make an argument is to assume the opposite and show that it is absurd. If man-made 
capital were a near perfect substitute for natural capital, then natural capital would be a near 
perfect substitute for man-made capital. But if so, there would have been no reason to accumulate 
man-made capital in the first place, since we were endowed by nature with a near perfect 
substitute. But historically we did accumulate man-made capital – precisely because it is 
complementary to natural capital. [...] Man-made capital is itself a physical transformation of 
natural resources which come from natural capital. Therefore, producing more of the alleged 
substitute (man-made capital), physically requires more of the very thing being substituted for 
(natural capital) – the defining condition of complementarity! 
 
This paper thus assumes that the essence and relations of all objects are at best 
complementary rather than substitutable. For instance, it is common sense that objects 
such as sawmills cannot substitute for stocks of wood (Daly, 1979, 1992), and the other 
way around, which necessitates rethinking the role of objects and the current industrial 
practices that transform objects at an increasing pace. And what follows the 
irreducibility and non-substitutability of objects is the quality of uniqueness. The 
uniqueness of objects directs scholars away from any reductionist mode of organisation 
studies towards more inclusive frameworks (see e.g., Purser et al., 1995; Reed, 2005; 
Lozano, 2008), and guides them to proceed with caution when organising and managing 
objects, as well as encouraging respect for the exceptionality of all objects. 
 
 
5. Discussion on object-oriented ecosophy 
 
As the essential qualities of objects in this study are derived from object-oriented 
philosophy (Harman, 2002, 2009) and ecological philosophy (Naess, 1973, [1974] 
1989). The three-point outline could be labelled object-oriented ecosophy. In the 
following, the reasons why the emergence of ontological discussion in ecological 
studies could be valuable, and the implications of the outline for ecological theory and 
practice are discussed. 
 
Autonomy is very relevant to ecocentric theory, as the ‘notion of autonomy does not 
correspond to the old notion of freedom, which was to a certain extent immaterial and 
detached from constraints and physical contingencies’ (Morin, [1994] 2008, p. 69). 
According to Morin ([1994] 2008, p. 69), ‘it is, on the contrary, a notion closely linked 
to that of dependency, and the latter is inseparable from the notion of self-organization’. 
That is, objects are emergent, a quality that might be measured or registered by their 
relationships, ‘but can never be fully defined by them’ (Harman, 2009, p. 143). This 
quality enables scholars to describe and prescribe different agencies for objects, yet 
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keep them embedded in the ecosystem. For example, it is commonly accepted that 
without a degree of autonomy, no moral responsibility for sustainability (or any other 
end) can be assigned or assumed. Further, when ethics is considered an essential 
element in achieving sustainability (de Paula and Calavanti, 2000), then moral agency is 
needed to enable, or at least support, the change. Thus, it is vital that the degree of 
autonomy can be used to explain different agencies in scientific enquiry instead of 
claiming full interdependency between objects, which leaves little or no room for moral 
agency (or quality) in objects (see e.g., Latour, 2002). 
 
However, without a degree of autonomy, objects lack the ability to act and to explore 
their full potential. The idea of the degree of autonomy urges researchers and 
practitioners of ecological organising to gradually move from questions such as ‘how 
are objects related to each other?’ to more practically relevant questions such as ‘what 
are the implications if all objects are assumed to have agency beyond their relations to 
other objects, and thus also beyond human comprehension?’ Consequently, humans 
responsible for organisations become better equipped to appreciate the idea that they 
need not only to understand how objects are related to each other in the production 
system, but also to understand the capability of all objects to surprise the production 
system with their inherent agency. 
 
While a degree of autonomy is an essential part of object-oriented ecosophy, it becomes 
ecologically strong only when complemented with the other two qualities. By realising 
that objects are not substitutes for other objects and cannot be reduced to any other 
object, the quality of uniqueness becomes accessible, and when objects disclose 
uniquely in a specific time and place horizon, it calls for the theory and practice to 
respect and embrace their exceptionality, including transformation, change, 
decomposition and death, that is, also the vulnerability and fatality of objects. 
 
This quality should prompt both researchers and managers to scrutinise the ethics of 
depriving any object of its agency or existence. The focal implication for organisational 
practices would thus be to proceed with caution when organising and managing objects. 
Assuming objects, such as people, animals, forests, chairs, activities, ideas and sounds, 
are entities that are irreducible and non-substitutable invites us to consider that objects 
possess not only instrumental value dependent on other objects but, most importantly, 
value in themselves. This kind of inherent value translates to the quality of 
intrinsicality. The main implication of intrinsicality for organisational enquiry is that it 
releases objects from the instrumental rationale, and signifies the right of objects to 
disclose on their own, that is, to live and flourish. 
 
Moreover, object-oriented ecosophy and the quality of intrinsicality hold crucial 
instrumental value for an enquiry into ecological organisation. In other words, if it is to 
imagine, practice, and manage those organisational orderings that are to stay within 
material boundaries, humankind has to embrace the existence of all objects for their 
own sake and therefore to admit their intrinsic value. In the light of anthropocentric 
thought, this rationale might seem paradoxical for two reasons. First, although 
instrumentality and intrinsicality usually (if not always) coexist in an object, they are 
often thought of in dualistic terms, as opposites. Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
think that they could not coexist in an object. Second, the rationale behind intrinsicality 
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is supported with an instrumental logic dictating that if people are to imagine and 
practice those ecological orderings, they need to embrace the existence of all objects for 
their own sake. Again, teleological argumentation (which claims something for the sake 
of an end) can be considered to conflict with the idea of intrinsicality only if 
intrinsicality is presumed to be something that is antithetical to instrumentality. 
 
An ecological turn based on these ecocentric premises represents a radical departure 
from mainstream organisation theory and shallow environmental turns within and 
around it. There is little doubt that importing ecological concepts into organisation 
theory will involve a major reorientation (Purser et al., 1995), which will take time. It is, 
however, rather encouraging to note that ecologically advanced ontological turns are 
occurring in sociology (Urry, 2011) and economics (Spash, 2012). However, the 
question remains whether ecocentric theory must still be developed on the outskirts of 
contemporary organisation theory, or whether society will open up and begin taking the 
threats of the Anthropocene seriously. 
 
Be that as it may, the paper considers that given the proposed set of essential qualities of 
objects (see Table 2 for a summary), organisational scholars would be willing and able 
to build practically relevant and ecologically advanced theories that consider the non-
human and material realms as integral parts of the analysis without falling into the trap 
of dualism or unsatisfactory representations of nature (see Newton, 2002; Hanna, 1996). 
Furthermore, such a descriptive outline could offer a response to the critique of 
ecocentric theorising being just normative ecological ordering that is doomed to fail, 
since it is merely an ontology that is not considered to be over-encompassing or forced 
on anyone. It may or may not be realised. 
 
 
Table 2. The table illustrates the essential qualities of objects and the implications to 
ecocentric theory and practice. 
 
 
Quality of objects 
 
 
Autonomy 
 
Intrinsicality 
 
Uniqueness 
 
Underlying 
assumption and 
key literature 
 
Objects are not fully defined by 
their relationships with other 
objects but have a degree of 
autonomy (Harman, 2002; 2009) 
 
 
Objects are not considered to be 
merely instruments for, or means 
to, other objects but have value in 
themselves (Naess, [1974] 1989) 
 
 
Objects are irreducible (Harman, 
2002; Naess, [1974] 1989) and 
non-substitutable (Daly, 1979) 
 
Description of the 
quality 
 
 
All objects have a degree of 
autonomy 
 
 
All objects are ends in themselves 
 
 
All objects are 
unique 
 
Theoretical 
implication 
 
 
Some objects are more 
autonomous than others 
 
 
No object should be treated 
merely as a means 
 
 
Objects disclose in a specific time 
and place horizon 
 
Practical 
implication 
 
 
Autonomy can be used to explain 
and assign different (moral) 
agencies, i.e. objects’ ability to act 
and explore their fullest potential 
 
 
Intrinsicality releases objects from 
instrumental rationale, and 
signifies the right of objects to 
disclose on their own; to live and 
blossom 
 
 
Uniqueness suggests precaution in 
organising activities and the 
conservation of ecosystems, as 
well as embracing the diversity of 
objects 
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The ontological outline suggested in this paper escapes the kind of realism where reality 
is objective and accessible to humans objectively, as well as the kind of antirealism 
where realities are socially constructed and always relative to subjective human 
interpretation. The philosophical position of the present study decentralises the human 
subject by assuming that reality may be objective but knowledge about it only 
subjective. A significant motivation for leaving the antirealism behind comes from 
noting that these positions are not equipped to face the ongoing ecological catastrophe 
(Bryant et al., 2011) that is the Anthropocene. 
 
It has been argued that if humans are to move to ecocentric ontologies, they need more 
than a popular, observer-style understanding of ecology (Purser et al., 1995, also Morin, 
[1994] 2008). Thus, in addition to embedding social actors in the ecosystem (Whiteman 
and Cooper, 2000), recognising the interconnectedness of all actors in that ecosystem, 
(Valente, 2012; Newton, 2000), and advancing ethical considerations to encompass the 
non-human world (Gosling and Case, 2013; Ezzamel and Willmott, 2014), objects 
would have a metaphysical footing of their own. ‘Objects exist as autonomous units, but 
they also exist in conjunction with their qualities, accidents, relations, and movements 
without being reducible to these’ (Harman, 2009, p. 156). Becoming aware of the 
qualities of objects necessitates engaging with the objects in a direct and open manner, 
that is, encountering them without instrumentalisation. 
 
While the popular knowledge of objects is a sort of ‘spectator epistemology that 
assumes that by withdrawing from participation in the world, objects can be described 
and represented as if there were no subjective observer (with values, feelings, etc.)’ 
(Purser et al., 1995, p. 1059), the situational knowing that object-oriented ecosophy 
hints at does not exclude subjectivity from objects or values from ontology. Subjective 
sentiments such as values in fact play a central role in the ecocentric ontology that is not 
dominated by, or limited to, instrumental rationality (Purser et al., 1995). Furthermore, 
several scholars have pondered whether the groundlessness that characterises modern 
living is preventing humans from developing deeper understandings of, and relations to, 
objects (Heidegger, [1945] 2010; von Wright, 1978; Ingold, 2011). If so, then re-
establishing grounds for time- and space-sensitive knowing by anchoring practices in 
closer proximity would be warranted. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The current research indicates that the new geological era of the Anthropocene calls for 
a new ontology to guide the organisation of human activities. The ontology proposed 
here takes a realist and ecocentric turn to avoid the pitfalls of the antirealist and 
anthropocentric approaches. Drawing from object-oriented (Harman, 2002, 2009) and 
ecological philosophies (Naess, 1973, [1974] 1989), the study proposes three essential 
qualities common to all objects, namely autonomy, intrinsicality, and uniqueness. The 
ontological outline formed by these three points responds to the critique of ecocentric 
organisation studies. It demonstrates how to avoid the human–nature dualism by 
considering each thing an object while still arriving at an ecologically relevant view of 
reality. 
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The outline labelled object-oriented ecosophy facilitates explaining and assigning 
different agencies depending on the degree of autonomy, the release of objects from an 
instrumental ethical rationale, and the reasoning behind exercising caution around 
objects and encouraging their conservation. When the suggested qualities are assumed 
in organising activities, objects become capable of unfolding in their own ways 
(autonomy), acquire rights to exist on their own (intrinsicality), and are respected for 
what they are (uniqueness). 
 
The current study’s main contribution to ecological organisation theory and practice is 
to provide a framework for reimagining the object–object relations central to the 
peaceful coexistence of objects. This includes the reconsideration of the relationship 
between humans and the natural environment, and the consequent need to reorganise 
production activity in a manner that embraces the diversity of objects. The ongoing 
growth of human economic activity has had a severe impact in terms of reducing the 
diversity of life, leading to a call for a ‘degrowth society’ (Daly, 1996; Latouche, 2009; 
Jackson, 2011). Object-oriented ecosophy offers an ontological outline for this 
transition. If the suggested qualities of objects are perceived in organisations, then 
organisations are likely to radically reduce the instrumentalisation of objects, including 
the use of so-called natural resources or capital. In practice, the outline is to signify a 
decrease in the rate of material throughput needed to reach sustainability (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1975; Daly, 1996) and an ecological organisation. 
 
The limitations of this paper relate to the conceptual nature of the study. Whether the 
proposed ontological outline is actually suited to promote sustainability and would lead 
to desirable changes in organisational practice is a question that must be explored 
empirically. Future studies might therefore test the model in organisations, and 
encompass further theoretical work on the qualities and activities of objects. 
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